

small, means
2. out is re-
4. extremely
wsm

NEGATIONS by Herbert Marcuse, 1968

In 1st (1934) essay, "Struggle against Liberalism in Totalitarianism" there is a section on Existentialism

Lacks conceptual character hence HM 1st takes up existential politics, how concretization stopped with its view that "Man is essentially a social creature, i.e. he is not a creature whose being is determined by his participation in a higher 'spiritual world'..but he is rather an originally acting creature. After this Nazi slogan HM further develops 'activism' without a reason why, correctly concluding (p. 34) "this anthropology derives its pathos from a radical EVALUATION OF LOGOS

as knowledge that reveals & decides."

Then HM contrasts, how, as against "With the realization of the total-authoritarian state, existentialism abolishes itself" it "ORIGINALLY based itself on the 'private' character of individual existence," but now ends with Heidegger's "Today & in the future, only the fuhrer himself is Ger. reality & its law."

Existentialism, which at one time understood itself to be the heir of Ger. Idealism, has given up the greatest intellectual heritage of Ger. It was not with Hegel's death but only now that the Fall of the Titans of Ger. phil. occurs

1936. 2nd essay, "The Concept of Essence" goes through that historically as if just the contrast of essence to appearance is what Marx has not only inherited but merely put a material base under.

"Their [concepts] metaphysical character betrays more than it conceals, for so much of [men's real] struggles & desires went into the metaphysical quest for an ultimate unity, truth, universality of Being, that they COULD NOT HAVE FAILED TO FIND EXPRESSION IN THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE PHIL. TRADITION."

FROM DESCARTES'S ego cogito, at beginning of cap. era to binding man to a given condition, at end of era: "It is no longer the spontaneity of the concept but the receptivity of intuition that serves as the organon of the doctrine of essence. COGNITION CULMINATES IN RECOGNITION WHERE IT REMAINS FIXATED. Husserl's phenomenology can be considered a delayed attempt to re-vigorate bourgeois theory with the basic forces & concepts of Ger. Idealism (in which doctrine of essence has found its classical form" (p. 44)

Of Leszek Kolakowski's analysis of Husserl's criticism of 19th c. positivism as symptomatic of CULTURAL CRISIS "as a theory which reduces human life to animal forms of appropriating the world & that rules out all possibility of ever encountering truth. This was why he set out in search of certain knowledge; the purpose of his transcendental reduction is to rediscover the irreducible primitive domain lost sight of by positivists & evolutionists. Husserl, less sensitive to the non-being of the believed

Dependent
G. L. G.

Herbert Marcuse
The Phenomenology
of the Spirit

Charles
1936

3rd essay "The Affirmative Character of Culture"
What HM states about div. bet. mental & manual work in Greek society is not, as presently taken by him as "forever" true, but, on the contrary, here HM shows what a sharp division from philosopher-kings concepts and its concomitant special interests to carry it out occurs in bourgeois epoch; # In its place emerges the thesis of the universality & universal validity of "CULTURE" (p.93)..Altho the fact has not changed, the good conscience has disappeared

"There is a concept of culture that can serve as an important instrument of social research because it expresses the application of the mind in the his process of society." There is however another fairly widespread usage of the concept of culture in which the spiritual world is lifted out of its social context, making culture a (false) collective noun & attributing (false) universality to it. (like national culture)"

"Hegel goes poorly with an authoritarian state; he was for the mind, while the moderns are for the soul and for feeling. THE MIND CANNOT ESCAPE REALITY WITHOUT DENYING ITSELF; the soul can & is supposed to do so. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE THE SOUL DWELLS BEYOND THE ECONOMY THAT THE LATTER CAN MANAGE IT SO EASILY."

4th & last of the serious pre-WW essays, "Philosophy & Critical Theory", which, it turns out, refers (bot) to Young Hegelians (Marx; though he never says so outright) placing the origins of "critical theory" in the 1830's & 1840's includes both & both are therewith contrasted to Hegelian philosophy as appearing "within the eco. concepts of material theory" was so included because it was most advanced form of consciousness, by contrast with ~~which~~ eco. conditions which were backward, so that criticism of est. order began as a critique of that consciousness, which, it is admitted, did not separate Reason from Freedom. As contrasted to mer ideologies therefore idealism is not one of domination "precisely to the extent that it is really idealistic" (p.140)

This remark by HM is all the more curious because the intro of the 1960's (1968) tried to hang upon it the concept of machine as "subject", technical rationality & of all things blame "critical theory", by which he obviously means Marxism for ~~which~~ "did not its concept of a free & rational society promise, not too much, but too little?" (p.xvi)

Handwritten notes in left margin:
"IT IS NOT RIGHT CONCERNED..."
"as a sequence of..."
"Mind..."
"to the..."

Handwritten notes in middle margin:
"Hegel attacks culture, not as a national but as self-destructive"
"Hegel attacks culture, not as a national but as self-destructive"

Handwritten scribbles in left margin.

Large handwritten notes at bottom:
"Only when Reason was needed..."
"was so acceptable..."
"Hegel attacks culture, not as a national but as self-destructive"
"Hegel attacks culture, not as a national but as self-destructive"