


YOUNG SOCIALIST

SEPT.-OCT. 1965

25¢



**NEW RADICALS AND
THE FIGHT AGAINST WAR**

YOUNG SOCIALIST

YOUNG SOCIALIST NOTES

Vol. 9, No. 1 (66)

SEPT.—OCT. 1965

Editor: Doug Jenness

Business Manager: Peter Camejo

Circulation Manager: Will Reynolds

Design: Melissa Singler

Technical Assistants: Robin David, Bonnie Sheppard

Editorial Board: Jon Pederson, Jack Barnes, Dick Roberts, Elizabeth Barnes, Ralph Levitt

Table of Contents

THE NEW RADICALS	3
LOS ANGELES GHETTO EXPLODES	6
THE KOREAN WAR	7
ALGERIAN COUP	12
INTERVIEW WITH FRENCH COMMUNIST STUDENT	18

Subscription Price: \$1. per year. Bundle rate: 20 cents per issue on orders of 5 or more (15 cents for news-stands). The YOUNG SOCIALIST is published bi-monthly. P.O. Box 471, Cooper Station, New York, 10003. Phone, YU 9-7570. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the YOUNG SOCIALIST.

COVER: U.S. Marines land at Danang airbase in Vietnam
Thousands of students protest war at Berkeley Vietnam Day

YOUNG SOCIALISTS IN CANADA HOLD FOUNDING CONVENTION: Fifty delegates and guests from Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal, and other areas throughout Canada, attended the founding convention of the Young Socialist Forum held in Toronto July 17-18. Discussion centered on the growing radicalization among young people in high schools and on the college campuses. The continuing growth of the YSF can be seen in the convention decision to expand their monthly newspaper *The Young Socialist Forum*.

Observers from the Young Socialist Alliance were present and Doug Jenness, editor of the *Young Socialist* extended greetings from the YSA to the convention.

YS GOES BI-MONTHLY: With this issue the *Young Socialist* begins regular bi-monthly publication. The interest in the YS and the support our readers have given the magazine has made it possible for us to publish six issues a year instead of five as was originally announced. The subscription rate remains the same—\$1 per year.

A NEW PUBLICATION: *Viet Report*, an emergency news bulletin on Southeast Asian Affairs, is appearing in bookstores, on anti-war committee literature tables, and at rallies. Sponsored by the University Committee to Protest the War in Vietnam, it contains articles on the history of Vietnam, facts about the National Liberation Front, book reviews, and statements of protest against the war. Contributors include Staughton Lynd, Stanley Millet, and Bernard Fall. The subscription rate is \$5 per year and bulk rates are available. For further information write: *Viet Report*, 133 West 72nd Street, New York, New York 10023.

ASSEMBLY OF UNREPRESENTED PEOPLE: On August 6-9 in Washington, D. C., leaders of peace groups, civil rights groups, and community organizations from all over the country came together in an Assembly of Unrepresented People. The purpose of the Assembly was to encourage communications between movements protesting against U. S. foreign policy, racial discrimination, poverty, and infringements of civil liberties.

One important and concrete development that came out of this Assembly was the establishment of a temporary National Coordinating Committee

(continued on page 22)

Vietnam workshop meets on grass around the Washington monument during Assembly of Unrepresented People, Aug. 6-9.



Photo by Finer

NEW RADICALS AND THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

BY DOUG JENNESS
Editor, *Young Socialist*

The feeling in this country against the war in Vietnam has reached enormous dimensions and a number of pollsters agree that at least twenty-five per cent of the population favors the withdrawal of American troops. This large scale but as yet largely unorganized opposition has laid the foundation for the biggest anti-war protest movement this country has ever seen. Demonstrations, rallies, and teach-ins have become regular events, and there is scarcely a day now when there is not some form of protest against the war. Committees, *open to anyone who is willing to work against the war*, have sprung up from one end of the country to another and have vigorously carried out activities through the summer months.

New Radicalism

Out of this rapidly growing anti-war movement there has crystallized a small group of militants who are looking for ways to relate all the strug-

gles against injustice in this society into a general movement for social change. This generation of New Radicals has stepped forward to become the leaders and organizers of the growing anti-war protest. Their uncompromising and politically independent tone was expressed in a resolution passed at the Los Angeles Congress of Unrepresented People on August 8. One section states that, "The time has come for the voice of the unrepresented to be heard, from the councils of our cities to the halls of Congress in Washington, D. C. To that end we pledge to oppose any candidate for public office who supports the war in Vietnam. We will oppose any candidate who does not support the liberation struggle of the Negro people in this country. We will oppose any candidate that is tied to the twin parties of war and racism." It is not surprising to hear that such political proclamations as this are coming out of the anti-war movement. The refusal of the anti-war militants to water down their opposition to the war in Vietnam

for the benefit of Democratic politicians, the Administration or anyone else has been demonstrated on other occasions.

It was clearly shown as far back as the organization of the SDS March of Washington (April 17) when SDS refused to tone down its call, which accurately named the Vietnamese war a civil war, or to exclude radical organizations. It was also evident in a different way at the Berkeley Vietnam Day last May when the speakers most critical of the Johnson Administration and the Democratic Party received the greatest applause from the students.

It has become most recently evident in the growing polemics between the spokesmen for this layer of militants and the spokesmen for the old "pacifist-socialist" school of coalition compromisers—the Rustins, Thomases and McReynolds.

Independent Politics

People often associate the word "politics" with the ritualistic running of candidates but this is not the essence of politics. For example, the anti-war movement, which is an independent political movement, is not defined as such by whether or not it runs independent candidates. The demonstrations, rallies, articles and leaflets that directly attack the Democratic and Republican Parties' support of the dirty war in Vietnam is in reality independent political action. To refuse all aid and comfort to the Democratic Party while it continues to wage war against the Vietnamese people or carries out any other war of aggression is independent political action. To run political candidates independent of the Democratic and Republican Parties *without supporting and helping to organize other forms of protest is merely electoral routinism*. The Socialist Labor Party has been carrying out this kind of independent politics for years.

Running candidates, however, has not been rejected and should not be rejected. Just as the SDS March on Washington received widespread publicity and brought the growing protest movement against the war in Vietnam to the attention of even larger numbers of people, the running of candidates opposed to the war in Vietnam is another device for publicizing the character of the war and imparting arguments for why the U.S. should get out. Electoral activity opens the door to additional publicity opportunities such as radio and TV time, speaking engagements, debates, etc., as well as providing an opportunity for publicizing the necessity of independent politics. The essential fact is that it would be a mistake for the anti-war movement to refuse to use any means available to fight against the war.

Need for Social Revolution

Coupled with the growing attitude for the necessity of an independent movement is the realization among a small but rapidly growing current that the only solution that will end American wars of aggression like the war in Vietnam is the complete transformation of the social system in this country. When one woman in the Vietnam workshop at the Washington Assembly of Unrepresented People in August urged for a campaign to impeach President Johnson, a number of people argued that impeaching Johnson would not do any good unless the present social system was completely destroyed and another erected in its place. The essence of the Assembly of Unrepresented People concept points to the fact that the struggles of the Negro people, the poor people, and the anti-war movement are all different parts of the general struggle against this system. This is not to say that a powerful movement around the single issue of getting American troops out of Vietnam cannot find broad areas of support and grow into a powerful political force. Rather it is the realization that a social revolution is the only permanent solution to this kind of war in general.

It is too early to forecast where this fresh new anti-war movement with all of its independence and militancy will end up. It depends in large part on what role the most conscious and the most political of the leading activists play in organizing the movement and continuing to develop its revolutionary and independent currents.

Failure of Coalition Politics

There have been occasions before in American history when strong independent movements have risen. The CIO was such an example. However, due to the role played by the two largest radical political organizations in the labor movement in the 1930's—the Socialist and Communist Parties—the labor movement never took the necessary steps toward independent political organization. Stephen Arnold reviewing Art Preis's recently published history of the CIO (*Labor's Giant Step*) in the *National Guardian* (July 3, 1965) underlines this point when he writes that he is "sympathetic to his [Preis's] criticism of the main currents of the left for the failure to fight for an independent labor politics. There is no doubt that the CIO's support for Roosevelt in 1936 marked a real turning point in the ideologies of most of the major radical trade unionists, who in fact, shared considerable leadership within the new movement."

The primary reason these Old Radicals in the Communist and Socialist Parties, failed to provide the leadership for developing the independent political tendencies in the labor movement was not because of insincere moral intentions but rather

because of *their faulty political perspective*. Instead of projecting the necessity of a social revolution they had an orientation toward reforming and democratizing this system. Their position was that the Democratic Party was not so bad and by putting pressure on its liberal wing it could be reformed. This notion that peace and democracy were possible by patching up American capitalism led to the role of the CIO as a left pressure group within the Democratic Party.

During the 1964 election campaign we saw a similar phenomenon when civil rights leaders like Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King and others called a moratorium on civil rights demonstrations so as not to embarrass the Democratic Party. The forward and generally independent thrust of the Negro struggle was channeled into coalitionism with "lesser evil" Johnson. If there was ever a time to test the correctness of the theory of coalition with the Democratic Party this election campaign was it. Nearly every peace leader and civil rights leader including the Socialists, Communists and pacifists joined the wild orgy of coalitionism against Goldwater. However, after the elections it became clear that the only fruits of this "left pressure" was to give Johnson more elbow room in carrying out the brutal war against the Vietnamese people.

Just as the election campaign was an all time high point in coalition politics the new anti-war movement is one of the richest expressions of revulsion against the Johnson regime's high-handed expansion of the brutal war in Vietnam.

Reformists Attack New Radicals

It is no wonder, then, that Bayard Rustin, Norman Thomas and other coalitionists have attacked the New Radicals. The red-baiting statement that some of these "respectable" peace leaders issued on the eve of the SDS March on Washington has been well publicized and has become infamous among the anti-war militants.

The conflict that has been raging in the peace movement since the SDS March on Washington is a *political conflict* between those like Rustin, Thomas, and McReynolds who still want to maintain a coalition with the Democratic Party and the New Radicals who see the Democratic Party, the "liberal wing" notwithstanding, as the enemy and want to organize an opposition to it. The debate over the question of whether or not radical organizations should be permitted to participate in the anti-war activities and committees is part of this general political cleavage that exists in the peace movement.

Staughton Lynd in an open letter to Rustin (*Studies on the Left*, Summer, 1965) sharply

criticizes him for red-baiting the March on Washington and for his refusal to support it because of the participation of radical political organizations like the Young Socialist Alliance, the Du Bois Club and the Progressive Labor Party. "What I think this means," writes Lynd, "is that you do not believe in an independent peace movement. You believe in a peace movement dependent on the Johnson Administration."

The current political debate between the Old Peace Establishment and the New Radicals is conclusive evidence of the independent political road that the anti-war movement is beginning to travel. However, independent actions in themselves, no more than sincere intentions and total "commitment," are enough to insure that the thousands mobilized in the present anti-war movement will not go the way of the CIO.

The New Radicals who see the need for a social revolution in this country must be extremely clear about the pitfalls of reformist and coalition politics and must formulate for themselves a consistent revolutionary perspective. The logic of breaking with the Democratic Party and its Socialist servants like Rustin is to create an independent political organization that aspires to lead and organize a social revolution.

Organizing Opposition to War

However, to realize the necessity of changing this rotten society from top to bottom in order to put an end to the kind of wars the U. S. is waging in Vietnam does not cut across the very important job of organizing as large a protest as possible around the specific issue of getting American troops out of Vietnam. The New Radicals who see the long run need for building an even more powerful movement that will carry out a social revolution have viewed and must continue to view the anti-war movement as an integral part of building this more general political movement.

The National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam formed out of the Vietnam workshop at the Assembly of Unrepresented People in August should initiate a massive membership drive. Organizers should be sent to every campus in the country to help set up new anti-war committees and every person in the country who is against the war in Vietnam should be signed up and involved in these committees and their anti-war protests.

The disorganized but growing mood of opposition against the war must be organized to the fullest extent possible, linking up with anti-war forces in other countries until a movement powerful enough to force the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam is created.

BLACK REVOLT IN LOS ANGELES

BY DAVID HERMAN
Staff Writer, *The Militant*

The recent spontaneous uprising of the black ghetto of Los Angeles is an event with profound implications about the nature of American society. Of all the public figures who had spoken about the black revolt or "Negro revolution" in America, only Malcolm X predicted what was coming, explained it clearly, and supported without reservation any action Afro-Americans would take to win freedom, justice, and equality.

Before considering Malcolm's prediction, explanation and prognosis for the black revolution, I will outline several of the widely held beliefs about American society that were exposed as myths by the explosion in Watts.

This eruption showed that:

(1) The United States does not have a stable, even unshakeable, political and social system despite its enormous prosperity. Watts occurred at the peak of America's longest peace-time boom, amidst the greatest prosperity in world history, and in a community where Negroes have had the civil rights that the Southern movement has sought for a long time.

(2) Anti-black racism is not primarily a Southern phenomenon but pervades the entire society. Racism is so deeply ingrained in American society that whites are unconscious of most of its forms. That is why Watts came as such a shock to most white Americans.

(3) The Negro struggle for emancipation is not an isolated phenomenon, affected only by the direct interests of the participants, but is affected by revolutionary events throughout the world as well as what is happening throughout the country. *Time* magazine of Aug. 20 reported that the battle cry of many in Watts was "This is for Selma" or "This is for Bogalusa." The New York *Herald Tribune* of Aug. 17 quoted one Negro soldier in Saigon: "They got us over here fighting for Georgia. Next think you know they'll have us fighting for South Africa."

It is the development of the struggle against



Malcolm X

oppression and for independence all over Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as the struggle in the South that explains why Watts exploded this summer rather than many years ago when conditions were at least as bad.

(4) The road of integration into current American society has not been chosen by the mass of Afro-Americans as the path they will follow in *trying* to achieve freedom, justice and equality. Although the question of nationality for Afro-Americans is still unresolved, the people of Watts showed clearly that they do not intend to join *this* American society and that black nationalism is a very strong current in the ghetto.

(5) The official "Negro leaders" do not have a significant following in the ghetto and were unable to influence the events in Watts.

Some of those leaders, like Martin Luther King, who preach nonviolence to the black people, demonstrated their hypocrisy. King was quoted in the Aug. 18 *New York Times* as saying it had been "necessary to use intelligent force to stem the rioting." Thus he supported the violence of the oppressor but condemned the violence of the oppressed.

Malcolm X, speaking at a symposium on the "Blood Brothers," at the Militant Labor Forum on May 29, 1964, offered several insights that help to explain what happened in Watts:

"The same conditions that prevailed in Algeria that forced the people, the noble people of Algeria, to resort eventually to the terrorist-type tactics that were necessary to get the monkey off their backs, those same conditions prevail today in America in every Negro community. . . .

"The next thing you'll see here in America — and please don't blame it on me when you see it — you will see the same things that have taken place among other people on this earth whose position was parallel to the 22 million Afro-Americans in this country

(continued on page 17)



U. N. troops burn homes of civilians "suspected" of aiding guerrillas in Korea

THE KOREAN WAR

BY GUS HOROWITZ

Perhaps no event since World War II is more misunderstood than the Korean War. Hardly had the Chinese revolution succeeded in 1949 than the armies of China and the United States met across the devastated countryside of Korea.

In Korea, as in Vietnam today, the war began as a civil war, where the opposing sides represented different social orders and battles were not confined to the front lines. To see this, one must examine the events leading up to the Korean War of 1950.

Korea Under Japan

From 1910 until the end of World War II, Korea was a Japanese colony. Although Japan was not a "western democracy" like Britain, France, or the United States, and although she was neither Christian nor white, her rule was as harmful to the Koreans and as beneficial to Japanese imperialism as any of the others could have hoped for themselves.

The years of Japanese rule did not dampen the aspirations of the Korean masses for indepen-

dence, however. They were one nation and expected independence on that basis. But the post-war destiny of Korea was decided by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference in 1943. No representatives of the Korean people were present. Later in the war it was decided—again not by the Koreans—that the Soviet Union would occupy Korea north of the 38th parallel and the United States would occupy the south. Korea would be unified, they said,—later.

The Koreans believed the Cairo Conference proclamation was going to be carried out and that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The Russians occupying the North were greeted with Soviet and Korean flags; the Americans in the South with U.S. and Korean flags. (George McCune, *Korea Today*.)

People's Committees Established

After Japan surrendered (August 14, 1945), but before U.S. troops landed (September 8, 1945) many Korean nationalists of different political persuasions set up a People's Republic in Seoul (now South Korea) which was based on local people's committees throughout all of Korea. North and South. Even after the United States started to suppress the People's Republic, the *Christian Science Monitor* (Jan. 3, 1946) said that it "enjoys far more popular support than any other single political grouping."

In the North, the peoples' committees, organized by the workers and peasants, assumed a revolutionary character; they took over government administration from the Japanese, instituted land reform, and established control over banks and industries. The foundations for a socialized economy were laid. The land reform was especially popular, for it confiscated land owned by wealthy and parasitic Korean landlords as well as Japanese-owned land. The land was distributed free of charge to the peasantry. No military government was set up in the North, and Korean officials whom the Russians accepted were given a considerable amount of autonomy.

In the South, however, the U.S. Army commander, from the very beginning, opposed the People's Republic and proclaimed that the "Military Government is the only government" in South Korea. MacArthur's Proclamation #1 said: "all government officials and employees [Japanese] . . . shall continue to perform their usual functions and duties." With this, the hated Japanese police appeared on the streets wearing armbands appeared.

marked "USMG—United States Military Government (Harold Isaacs, *No Peace In Asia*). The

welcoming banners quickly disappeared.

Land Reform — North and South

Syngman Rhee returned from the United States and assumed the leadership of the right wing, representing landlords and "respectable" Koreans who expected to receive the confiscated Japanese property. The United States appointed an advisory council with Rhee as chairman, filled government posts with conservatives, banned all left wing newspapers in 1946, put down strikes and set up company unions, allowed right wing terrorist bands to form and intimidate unions, peasants' organizations and even liberal political groups, and generally laid the basis for the counterrevolutionary Rhee dictatorship. Of the election that was held in 1946 to an advisory parliament, McCune said, "It was quite obvious to all observers that the election was undemocratic and superficial." The election of 1948, which the United States called a great victory for democracy and a repudiation of communism, was called by many observers "fraudulently conducted in an atmosphere of terrorism." These elections formed the "legal" basis for proclaiming South Korea a separate nation and perpetuating the division of Korea.

No significant land reform was carried out in the South, and as Rhee took over the government, the landlords had their way on the land and the government reneged on its promises of a land reform. Some of the industry confiscated from the Japanese—which represented 90% of all modern industry in Korea—was sold or leased to private capitalists. The reactionary government controlled the remainder of the industry. Though industrial production began to improve by 1949-1950, the standard of living was still far below pre-war conditions. (169) Estimates of unemployment ranged from 900,000–1,700,000, compared to a labor shortage in the North.

"Many Koreans feel they are worse off than they were under the Japanese," said Assistant Secretary of State John Hilderling in 1947. His statement confirmed the results of a public opinion poll that U.S. authorities had taken earlier which showed that a majority of South Koreans preferred Japanese occupation to American. (A. Wigfall Green, *Epic of Korea*, p. 95)

Green, who was an official of the U.S. Military Government in Korea, summed up the pre-war situation saying, "The Korean in the American area was lacking in food, clothing, and shelter and believed that his fellow-man in the Russian-occupied area could not be so bad off as he, himself, was. Indeed, his condition became much worse during the American occupation than it was before . . . but the greatest cause of failure of the American occupation of Korea may be

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW

For the first time in English—
Leon Trotsky on:
"Lenin's Final Struggle Against Bureaucracy"

Fall issue: 50 cents
1 year: \$1.50

ISR, 116 University Pl., New York, N.Y. 10003

attributed to the inaction of American authorities in distributing land and homes and other real property to the Koreans." (p. 97)

Why did the United States create these conditions in Korea? Harold Isaacs answered (*No Peace in Asia*), "The United States is seeking to establish its own decisive influence and control in Asia on terms which would suit *American* economic, political, and military requirements." These terms meant that the U.S. deliberately fostered the creation of the South Korean government as a government of the landowning aristocracy and capitalists, a government in which the U.S. interests would be respected and accepted. All revolutionary action by the landless peasantry or urban workers was suppressed.

North Korea, on the other hand, expropriated the old possessing classes and instituted revolutionary measures like land reform and socialization of industry. Despite any questions that may be raised about political democracy in North Korea, it is clear that the peasants and workers—the vast majority—supported the revolutionary steps that were taken.

In Korea, North and South came to represent different social classes. Herein lies the secret to the Korean War.

The Civil War in Korea

War came to Korea, reads the official version, because North Korea invaded the South on June 25, 1950. The North Korean army advanced deep into South Korea and would have won if the Soviet Union had provided them with air

power. But the United States, fighting in the name of the United Nations, was able to drive the Northern armies back almost to the Yalu River border with China. China thereupon entered the war and drove the U.S. and South Korean armies back to the 38th parallel where a stalemate ensued, leading to the truce in 1953. North Korea and China are blamed for causing the war because they were intent on expanding "communist imperialism." The role of the United States was to "liberate" Korea from the communists in the name of democracy and freedom.

Is this analysis correct?

From a Marxist point of view, wars are caused, not by the side which fired the first shot, but by the clash of deep social, political, and economic forces. Who fired the "shot heard round the world" in 1775? Did the Union attack the Confederacy in 1861?—These are superficial questions. The real causes of those wars were deeper than any single act. So, too, in Korea.

The Korean War, like the war in Vietnam today, was a civil war; its essential ingredient was war between different social classes. The North rested upon the peasants and workers. To the crucial questions of land reform and a socialized economy it had answered—yes. But the Syngman Rhee dictatorship in the South was representative of the landowning aristocracy, Korean businessmen, and American interests. There would be no real land reform or socialization in South Korea. The U.S. Military Government had assured that. The peasantry and urban poor, who formed the majority, were denied any hope for the improvement of their conditions. They were unrepresented in South Korea.

Seen from this perspective, the Korean War began, not in 1950, but five years earlier when the Northern and Southern systems were founded on different class forces. This, and not diplomatic intransigence, is why North and South could not be unified by negotiation, and why an eventual clash was bound to occur. Just as the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam did not settle the war there, the division of Korea at the 38th parallel was destined to be temporary and unstable. Sooner or later one side would win; either the peasantry and workers or the small minority of exploiters.

Events before and during the Korean War showed that the nature of the war cut across geographical lines.

Before 1950, internal opposition to the Syngman Rhee regime was quite evident. One rebellion in 1948, reports David Rees in *Korea: The Limited War*, was "ruthlessly suppressed, and at one time one quarter of the country was under martial law. In 1949 Pyongyang [North Korea] was

claiming there were 77,000 communist partisans in the field."

Stanley Earl, an official of the Economic Cooperation Administration from Korea, reported that an internal rebellion against the Rhee government would have occurred if the North Korean army had not marched South. (*New York Times*, 7/30/50)

Border clashes during 1949 resulted in over 22,000 North Korean and 3,500 South Korean casualties, reports Green in *The Epic of Korea*. The casualty lists indicate that South Korea was no innocent victim. "We could defeat the North in two weeks," said Rhee in February, 1949. And in October, "I am sure we could take Pyongyang, the Northern capital in 3 days." Rhee's defense minister boasted that "South Korean troops were ready to make a drive into North Korea." (p 125)

In his book, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, I. F. Stone gives serious consideration to the possibility that South Korea may have provoked the war. But, again, determination of which side fired the first shot in a war is not an important question.

Once full-scale warfare broke out in 1950, the conduct of the opposing sides showed which classes they represented. Thousands of guerrillas, Southern as well as Northern, operated in the South behind the front lines for the duration of the war. As we have learned from Vietnam, guerrillas need the support of the surrounding peasant population to survive. Captured South Korean soldiers were given arms and drafted into the North Korean army—hardly possible if they were vehemently hostile. In contrast, the Southern prisoner of war camps contained civilians as well as soldiers.

"The alacrity with which thousands of South Koreans joined the Communist invaders in routing the South Korean army in the first days was a measure of their hatred for their government, its huge police force, and its army," wrote the president of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington to the United Nations. (*Voice of Korea*, 10/28/50) Many American soldiers told of the peasants who were South Korean by day and North Korean by night.

As the Northern armies advanced, they instituted revolutionary measures. "The promptness with which the North Koreans instituted drastic land reforms in the conquered areas of South Korea is an impressive fact for many Asians," said Harold Isaacs in the *New Republic* (August 7, 1950).

Later when the U. S. and South Korean armies advanced, Rhee proposed his own version of a land reform. "We were beginning land reform in the South when the war began," he said in a U. S.

News and World Report interview (10/27/50). "This land reform law will be extended to the North. We will do nothing about it during harvest this year, but next year *we will take away the land given the tenants and return it to the landlords.*" (emphasis added)

Of course Rhee's "land reform" measures and dictatorial methods did not endear him to the Korean people. The United States had to recognize Rhee's unpopularity despite the claim that Uncle Sam was "liberating" Korea in the name of freedom and democracy. For that reason, no truly democratic elections were allowed in territory occupied by the American and South Korean armies as they advanced. A *New York Times* writer explained that "there is a strong probability of an over-all Communist majority if the elections were held before the communization of North Korea had been undone, and before a U. N. reconstruction program had assuaged the bitterness of North and South Korea against the destruction of their homes during their liberation by U. N. forces. In that case communism would win by election what it had failed to obtain by an invasion." (8/24/50)

America's Dirty War in Korea

Because United States intervention was on the side of a hated and counterrevolutionary government, as in Vietnam today, the brutalities of war were directed against the population as a whole. John Osborne described the nature of the war in *Life* magazine (8/21/50):

"This means not the usual, inevitable savagery of combat in the field but savagery in detail—the blotting out of villages where the enemy MAY be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who MAY include North Koreans in the anonymous white clothing of the Korean countryside, or who MAY be screening an enemy march upon our positions, or who MAY be carrying broken-down rifles or ammunition clips or walkie-talkie parts in their packs and under their trousers or skirts . . .

"The South Korean police and the South Korean marines whom I observed in the front lines are brutal. They murder to save themselves the trouble of escorting prisoners to the rear; they murder civilians simply to get them out of the way or to avoid the trouble of searching and cross-examining them. And they extort information—information our forces need and require of the South Korean interrogators—by means so brutal they cannot be described. Too often they murder prisoners of war before they have had a chance to give any information they may have."

Both sides claimed atrocities against the other,

for the war was very brutal. But overshadowing all else was the great atrocity—the total devastation of Korea. The Korean masses bore the brunt of the suffering. Estimates place the dead at almost 3 million, most of them civilians. Some reporters said as many as 10 million people were made homeless. And this in a population of only 30 million!

In describing the terrible destruction of Korea, Greg MacGregor of the *New York Times* (6/14/53)—and he was not alone—said:

"Almost the entire direct responsibility for the physical destruction to South Korean properties and industries lies with the United Nations command . . . the areas ranging from just north of Taegu all the way to the Yalu River have been hammered unmercifully by the hard-hitting United Nations artillery and bombed many times over by the Air Force. Burning and pillaging by the Communists accounted for only a fraction of the total losses in lives and properties."

Such was the "liberation" of Korea.

War With China

The government today is seriously discussing expansion of the war in Vietnam into Korean proportions. Not only would such a war mean the devastation of Vietnam, but it would carry with it the possibility of another confrontation with China; for China, and what it represents, lies at the heart of America's Asian policy.

American foreign policy has been guided by a determination to prevent revolution and to seize on every opportunity to beat back revolutions where they have already taken place as in China.

The Korean War was a good example. It started as a civil war, North vs. South. But geography was only a disguise for its real nature, which was a clash of different social classes—akin to a revolution. This was not new. Our own Civil War represented the clash of Northern industrialists and Southern slaveowners, and has been called the Second American Revolution.

Into the Korean War, however, a foreign power, the United States, intervened on the side of the reactionary South. Not only did the U.S. reconquer South Korea, but it drove northward with the avowed purpose of undoing the social changes that had been accomplished. As the U.S. drove toward the Chinese border, serious consideration was given to the possibility of extending the war to China, to regain what it had just "lost." Only at this point did China enter the war and drive the U.S. back to the 38th parallel where a truce was eventually reached in 1953.

In the same manner, U.S. intervention in the Vietnamese civil war brings with it not merely counterrevolution in Vietnam, but the real possibility of a full-scale war with China and an attempt at undoing the tremendous achievement of the Chinese revolution.

MEET YOUNG SOCIALISTS IN YOUR AREA

ANN ARBOR: YSA, 543 S. 4th St., Ann Arbor, Mich., tel. 665-0735

BERKELEY—OAKLAND: YSA, c/o Ernie Erlbeck, 920 Cornell Ave., Albany, Calif. tel. 525-6932

U. of Cal.: Syd Stapleton, 2328 Oregon St., tel. 848-0355

BOSTON: YSA, c/o Judy White, 6 Hancock Pl., Cambridge, tel. 491-8893

Boston U.: Michael Tormey, 32 Vestry St., Beverly, tel. 922-4037

Harvard U.: Kim Allen, Quincy 611, Harvard U., tel. 354-5146

Brandeis U.: Sarah Ullman, East 507E, Brandeis U., tel. 899-3226

Tufts U.: Carol Lipman, 494 Mass. Ave., Cambridge, tel. 547-4532

Northeastern U.: Stephen Fogg, 64 Westland Ave.

M.I.T.: Nat London, Baker House (M.I.T.), 362 Memorial Dr.

CHICAGO: YSA, 302 S. Canal St., tel. 939-5044

Roosevelt U.: YSA, c/o R.U. Activities Office

CLEVELAND: YSA, E.V. Debs Hall, 5927 Euclid Ave., Rm. No. 25

DENVER—BOULDER: YSA, c/o Bill Perdue, 1860 Race St., tel. 222-4174

DETROIT: YSA, 3737 Woodward Ave., tel. TE 1-6135

Wayne State U.: YSA, Box 49, Mac Kenzie Hall, WSU

LOS ANGELES: YSA, 1702 E. 4th St., tel. AN 9-4953

Los Angeles City Co.: Irving Kirsch, tel. 664-9236

UCLA: Mike Geldman, tel. GR 9-9592

Santa Monica City Col.: Pat Wolfe, tel. GR 4-6873

MADISON (Wisc.): YSA, 204 Marion St.

MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL: YSA, 704 Hennepin Ave., Mpls., tel. FE 2-7781

St. Paul: John Chelstrom, 151 Western Ave. N., tel. 225-3419

U. of Minn.: Bob Mears, 1819 16th Ave. S., Mpls.

NEW YORK DOWNTOWN: YSA, 116 University Pl., tel. AL 5-7852

Hofstra: c/o John Chairat, 146-11 Hillside Ave., Apt. 24, Jamaica

UPTOWN: YSA, c/o Caroline Jenness, 516 E. 11th St., tel. 982-1846

N.Y. City College: Wendy Reissner, 430 W. 46th St., #3e, tel. CI 6-2348

Columbia University: Diana DuPree, 344 W. 88th St., #2a, tel. 799-0388

PHILADELPHIA: YSA, c/o Ted Fagin, 212 S. 41st St.

SAN DIEGO: YSA, 1853 Irving, tel. 239-1813

SAN FRANCISCO: YSA, Pioneer Book Store, 1722 Page St.

Oakland City Col. (Meritt Campus): Jaimy Allen, 545 Clayton St., tel. 863-6295

San Francisco State Col.: Kipp Dawson, 652 B Clayton, tel. UN 3-2453

SAN JOSE: YSA, c/o Dennis Bayard, 1992 Bowers Ave., Santa Clara, tel. 248-9030

SEATTLE: YSA, c/o Ron Ginther, 3815 5th Ave. NE., tel. LA 3-5950

TALLAHASSEE: c/o Bruce Huston, 503 W. Jefferson St.

YELLOW SPRINGS (Ohio): YSA, c/o Community Govt., Antiach Union

DISTRIBUTORS OF THE YS IN CANADA:

VANCOUVER: Young Socialist Forum, 1208 Granville, tel. 682-9332

OTTOWA: Young Socialist Forum, Box 4093, P. O. "E"


TORONTO: Young Socialist Forum, 32 Cecil St., tel. 924-0028

BY MARY ALICE STYRON

The night of June 19, 1965, marked a decisive turning point in the Algerian Revolution. Minister of Defense, Col. Houari Boumedienne, backed by a section of his 60,000 man professional army and aided by a few important figures in the Algerian government, moved his troops with lightening speed to occupy key posts in the cities and countryside. The three year coalition between Ben Bella and Boumedienne, which in the summer of 1962 had ousted the neo-colonialist Provisional Government, was broken, and the army, headed by Boumedienne, was now in control.

It was impossible for the Boumedienne government to maintain the myth of normalcy in the face of continuing riots, some of which were severely suppressed. However, by July 5, the third anniversary of Algerian independence, calm had returned to the streets and demonstrations had ceased. The weakness of the opposition to the coup is evidence of the prevailing apathy of the Algerian people in the absence of any organization capable of inspiring them with a will to resist. At the same time, however, the protests that did erupt indicated fibres of strength within the Algerian revolution.

Boumedienne had learned that Ben Bella intended to move decisively against the ever growing influence of the army in governmental affairs, and it was rumored that at the next meeting of the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front (FLN), Ben Bella would ask for the removal of Foreign Minister Bouteflika who was considered to be in the far right-wing of the government. These moves would have strengthened Ben Bella's personal power, but combined with an extension of the land reform planned for the summer of 1965, they would have marked another significant step forward for the Algerian revolution.



Thousands gather to hear Ben Bella on the Second Anniversary of Algeria's independence, July 13, 1965

Prior to the coup, debate over Algeria's economic and political direction had taken place daily within the leading bodies of the Algerian government. The Tripoli Program, the political platform adopted by the FLN in June, 1962, had proclaimed that "the Popular Democratic Revolution is the conscious construction of the country according to socialist principles with the power in the hands of the people. In order that the development of Algeria be rapid and harmonious, and in order that the primary economic needs of the people be satisfied, it must be conceived within a socialist perspective, within the framework of collectivization of the basic means of production and within the framework of a rational plan."

Although this socialist perspective was frequently re-affirmed in the *documents* of the FLN, nearly half the seats on the National Committee and Political Bureau of the FLN were given to men opposed to the development of the nationalized sector of the economy, and opposed to the self-management committees. These political figures sabotaged attempts to limit speculation, and fought against restricting foreign profits.

Because this tendency favoring the capitalist sector of the economy was supported by most of the state apparatus, operations of the nationalized sector were continually hampered.

The other major political tendency in the FLN, was headed by Ben Bella. Its strongest base of support was in the self-management committees which developed in response to the vacuum created by the exodus of Europeans during the last months of the war. Eighty percent of them (virtually the entire middle class of Algeria) fled the country in early 1962, leaving farms, shops, and industries without owners or managers. With the fields full of crops, the peasants organized and brought in the harvest, dividing the proceeds among themselves. Soon these spontaneous peasant committees completely controlled large sections of the land throughout Algeria.

The same spontaneous appropriation took place in the industrial sector of the economy, resulting in the formation of factory committees that administered the plants. The Ben Bella government responded by legalizing and supporting the development of self-management, and by significantly strengthening the nationalized sector of the economy.

Ben Bella's effectiveness as a leader, however, was severely limited by the fact that he chose to play a mediating role between the two major factions within the government, balancing off left against right, making concessions first to one and then the other in an attempt to appease all. Boumedienne, on the other hand aligned himself

BACKGROUND TO COUP IN

ALGERIA

BY MARY ALICE STYRON

The night of June 19, 1965, marked a decisive turning point in the Algerian Revolution. Minister of Defense, Col. Houari Boumedienne, backed by a section of his 60,000 man professional army and aided by a few important figures in the Algerian government, moved his troops with lightening speed to occupy key posts in the cities and countryside. The three year coalition between Ben Bella and Boumedienne, which in the summer of 1962 had ousted the neo-colonialist Provisional Government, was broken, and the army, headed by Boumedienne, was now in control.

It was impossible for the Boumedienne government to maintain the myth of normalcy in the face of continuing riots, some of which were severely suppressed. However, by July 5, the third anniversary of Algerian independence, calm had returned to the streets and demonstrations had ceased. The weakness of the opposition to the coup is evidence of the prevailing apathy of the Algerian people in the absence of any organization capable of inspiring them with a will to resist. At the same time, however, the protests that did erupt indicated fibres of strength within the Algerian revolution.

Boumedienne had learned that Ben Bella intended to move decisively against the ever growing influence of the army in governmental affairs, and it was rumored that at the next meeting of the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front (FLN), Ben Bella would ask for the removal of Foreign Minister Bouteflika who was considered to be in the far right-wing of the government. These moves would have strengthened Ben Bella's personal power, but combined with an extension of the land reform planned for the summer of 1965, they would have marked another significant step forward for the Algerian revolution.



Thousands gather to hear Ben Bella on the Second Anniversary of Algeria's independence, July 13, 1965

Prior to the coup, debate over Algeria's economic and political direction had taken place daily within the leading bodies of the Algerian government. The Tripoli Program, the political platform adopted by the FLN in June, 1962, had proclaimed that "the Popular Democratic Revolution is the conscious construction of the country according to socialist principles with the power in the hands of the people. In order that the development of Algeria be rapid and harmonious, and in order that the primary economic needs of the people be satisfied, it must be conceived within a socialist perspective, within the framework of collectivization of the basic means of production and within the framework of a rational plan."

Although this socialist perspective was frequently re-affirmed in the *documents* of the FLN, nearly half the seats on the National Committee and Political Bureau of the FLN were given to men opposed to the development of the nationalized sector of the economy, and opposed to the self-management committees. These political figures sabotaged attempts to limit speculation, and fought against restricting foreign profits.

Because this tendency favoring the capitalist sector of the economy was supported by most of the state apparatus, operations of the nationalized sector were continually hampered.

The other major political tendency in the FLN, was headed by Ben Bella. Its strongest base of support was in the self-management committees which developed in response to the vacuum created by the exodus of Europeans during the last months of the war. Eighty percent of them (virtually the entire middle class of Algeria) fled the country in early 1962, leaving farms, shops, and industries without owners or managers. With the fields full of crops, the peasants organized and brought in the harvest, dividing the proceeds among themselves. Soon these spontaneous peasant committees completely controlled large sections of the land throughout Algeria.

The same spontaneous appropriation took place in the industrial sector of the economy, resulting in the formation of factory committees that administered the plants. The Ben Bella government responded by legalizing and supporting the development of self-management, and by significantly strengthening the nationalized sector of the economy.

Ben Bella's effectiveness as a leader, however, was severely limited by the fact that he chose to play a mediating role between the two major factions within the government, balancing off left against right, making concessions first to one and then the other in an attempt to appease all. Boumedienne, on the other hand aligned himself

with neither the left wing nor the right, but based his support on the army.

The struggle between capitalist and socialist tendencies revealed itself most sharply over the question of extending the land reform to affect the large holdings of Algerian proprietors. According to the Paris daily *Le Monde*, only one quarter of Algeria's farm land is now included in the self-managed sector. Half is divided into tiny plots of a few acres which barely sustain the peasants working them. The remaining quarter consists of large farms of several hundred acres owned by Algerians. European land holdings were nationalized in the fall of 1963.

Although it was announced more than a year and a half ago that a decree was being drawn up to limit the extent of private holdings, it was never implemented. Had this step been taken, it would have created great opposition among the Algerian proprietors and resulted in a split in the government. However, the outcome of such a split would have been an important step forward for the revolution, because the socialist forces, by taking the initiative and extending the benefits of the revolution to the most oppressed peasants, would have gained their active and enthusiastic support.

Instead of inspiring the peasants with the will to extend their revolution, Ben Bella made deals within the leadership of the government while attempting to increase his personal power. Because of this, the military coup appeared to the masses of peasants as just another leadership intrigue meaning little. While Ben Bella compromised himself more and more by back-corridor politics within the leading circles of the government, the neo-colonialist forces were gaining strength. The industrial working class of Algeria felt itself threatened and expressed its discontent in both word and action, as indicated by the strikes of January, 1965, where it demanded higher wages and better job security.

Due to the low level of economic development, however, the industrial working class within Algeria is extremely small, numbering only 100,000 in a population of over ten million. Yet this small percentage of the population has expressed itself loudly and frequently on every basic problem facing the revolution.

The self-managed sector of industry accounts for a very small percentage of the total production of Algeria, and controls only four per cent of Algeria's basic industry. Nine-tenths of the industrial workers are employed by privately owned companies, and in addition to this, Algeria has more than one million unemployed. Many of the industries abandoned in 1962 have never re-opened, due to lack of trained personnel, but it was projected

that all newly opened industries would begin production again under the control of self-management committees.

In the privately owned factories, the demand for workers' control over production was raised more than a year ago by the union at Renault-Algerie which "asked the government to promulgate a law instituting workers control in the non self-managed enterprises" (*Le Peuple*, May 28, 1964). The demand was immediately taken up by other unions and confirmed by the National Congress of the UGTA, the Algerian General Trade Union, meeting in Algiers in March, 1965. At this congress, the workers' dissatisfaction with their present leadership was so deep, that they voted the entire UGTA Executive Committee out of office, replacing it with many rank-and-file militants, including two women. (*Le Peuple*, March 29, 1965).

A week after the Boumedienne coup this new leadership passed a resolution which stated, "The opening provided by the event that occurred on June 19 would be put in question by the return to the political scene of careerists and opportunist elements, who are also responsible for the lack of respect for our institutions . . . For June 19 to become a genuine opening, it is necessary to also permit the emergence of tested militants, clear about their options, courageous in the expression of their opinions, and who have proved their genuine attachment to socialism." (*Le Monde*, June 29, 1965)

This resolution emphasized that "the extreme weakness of the party in organizational structure . . . and the failure to apply democratic centralism and the absence of a collective leadership" permitted "the reinforcement of personal power and the practice of anti-democratic methods." It went on to demand that "the FLN, party of the vanguard, be composed mainly of workers, of poor peasants and revolutionary intellectuals."

The composition, role, and structure of the FLN has been one of the most important disputes in the three years of Algeria's independence. Between 1954 and 1962 the National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Army of National Liberation, were well organized, efficient fighting organizations. They gained the support of the vast majority of the population and offered the country unity in its struggle against French domination. However, the leadership, by and large, was still fettered to the military-bureaucratic concepts of the army and the feudal-colonial structure it had always known. This phenomenon has been studied and analyzed by the FLN in the Tripoli Program: "Paradoxical as it may appear, the national revolutionary struggle is perceived and felt in its newness and its originality by the popular masses

more than by the leadership and the directorates . . . We have witnessed and are still witnessing a very serious lack of contact between, on the one hand, the collective consciousness tested in reality, and on the other hand, the practice and authority of the FLN at all levels. Very often, in a paternalistic manner, the authority has purely and simply substituted itself for political responsibility which is inseparable from the search for an ideology."

More important, the leadership was no ideologically prepared to deal with the struggles and splits that inevitably developed once the fighting stopped. This has disoriented the Algerian people time and again, and their weak response to the Boumedienne coup is merely the latest tragedy resulting from the ideological meanderings of the revolution's leadership.

A merger between the National Liberation Front and the state followed Algeria's victory over France. The army, however, maintained itself as a professional fighting unit, resisting the formation of local militias which would have become the primary defensive organizations of the revolution. This was one of the major points of contention between Boumedienne and Ben Bella. So strong was the army in this dispute that it was able to prevent the implementation of a decision of the National Congress of the FLN to create a popular militia.

A June 6, 1964, editorial in *Revolution Africaine*, written by Mohammed Harbi, declared that "the only effective way to meet these plots [terrorist acts of the OAS and the counterrevolution] is to set up without delay a *popular militia*, as was advocated by the Congress. The arming of the people is one of the main acts by which the revolutionary will of the leaders can be recognized. It is the only way that will make it possible to galvanize the energy of the people." (original emphasis). The publication of this editorial and others like it resulted in Ben Bella's removing Mohammed Harbi from his post as editor, in order to appease Boumedienne.

As the FLN and the state apparatus became more completely fused, the FLN became less the party of the vanguard and more thoroughly bureaucratized. Though the self-management committees and national unions of peasants and workers were still able to voice criticisms and put forward proposals for action, the FLN was not able to serve the function of a revolutionary party, bringing together the most conscious elements. Thus, no mechanism existed to hold the state apparatus in check; there was no form for developing leadership, and no way to educate the peasants and workers for the new struggles that continually faced them. As a consequence, it became extremely difficult for the leadership

to win enthusiasm, incentive, and direction from the peasants and workers. The National Congress of the FLN, meeting in the spring of 1964, recognized the need for such a revolutionary party and proposed to transform itself into such an organization by bringing into it more peasants and workers, and by expelling those who actively sabotaged the socialist perspective. However, the failure of the left wing of the FLN to resolutely work for this objective made the party unable to function as the vanguard, thus paving the way for Boumedienne's coup.

Because the FLN contained within it all the conflicting class interests of the country, it was unable to come to grips with the most pressing problems of the revolution. Land reform was one such problem, and control over natural resources and foreign investment was another. Under Ben Bella only minimal restrictions were placed on profits leaving the country, and upon taking power, Boumedienne rushed to assure the capitalist countries that investments in Algeria were secure.

The key role of oil in the Algerian economy can hardly be over-emphasized. If the petroleum industry were nationalized, the profits, most of which now go to foreign investors, would provide the necessary capital for trade and industrial development. These proceeds would enable Algeria to develop her other natural resources such as iron and natural gas. These profits could be re-invested in basic industries which in turn could produce machinery to expand existing industries and develop new ones. Such investment would also increase the size of the working class, as well as stabilize it financially, further strengthening the mass base of the socialist tendency. Furthermore, the openings for employment would attract from Europe much of the 400,000 man Algerian working class that still lives outside of the country and which is more highly skilled than the average worker living in Algeria. Tractors and other machines could be produced to mechanize the existing farms and make it profitable for the small peasants to collectivize their holdings. This would increase output and raise the rural standard of living greatly. In short, nationalization of the oil would lay the basis for the development of an industrialized Algeria, and in addition, provide money for construction, land reclamation, education, and medical care.

Those who favor a neo-colonialist development for Algeria, however, depend upon foreign capital to solve the industrial and employment problems of the country. They argue that since capitalism is responsible for the highly developed industrial economies of France, the United States, and Britain, why not Algeria? A close look at this argument



Former President Ahmed Ben Bella

reveals that the contradictions involved are tremendous. Those who favor capitalist development in under-developed countries today are opposed to those aspects of capitalism that made it at one time a socially progressive system. Those who support neo-colonialism oppose land reform, oppose the creation of a militia, oppose the development of a self-sustaining economy, and oppose the basic freedoms traditionally associated with middle class revolutions. It was the promise of these demands being fulfilled that historically justified the political ascendancy of the capitalist class.

The Algerian middle class, however, does not have the capital necessary to solve the immense social and economic problems that face the country. Consequently, in order to retain its relatively privileged social position it must rely on the power of foreign investment to deal with these issues. In this way, it is forced to play the role of unwilling broker for foreign investors. *Boumedienne, regardless of his intentions, will be forced either to play this role or to seek a new base of support in the masses of Algerian peasants and workers by extending and deepening the revolution. No alternative course exists for Algeria.*

The middle class is caught in a contradiction resulting from the fact that foreign investors have no desire to develop the Algerian economy, but only to extract those materials that are useful to

the economies of Europe and North America. It is little wonder, however, that the middle class has been forced to act in this manner. For decades its own development has been subordinated to the interests of the European investor who has determined—through force of arms and the power of the *franc*—the economic, social, and political structure of Algeria.

Without a rationally planned economy determining how profits will be invested, and how resources will be allocated, the wealth of Algeria will be accumulated by only a small handful of Algerians, with the lion's share going to foreign investors.

The failures and the successes of the Algerian revolution in dealing with these problems must be carefully studied and the lessons absorbed by anti-colonial forces the world over. It is unlikely, however, that any clarity will be forthcoming from the parties of the Second or Third Internationals. Their willingness to compromise the Algerian Revolution has already been sharply demonstrated. The Soviet Union even refused to recognize the FLN until France had done so. The struggle against France was greatly prolonged due to the isolation imposed on the FLN by the Communist bloc and by the leadership of the Communist and Socialist Parties of France.

This treacherous role was recognized by the FLN when it stated in the Tripoli Program that "the French political left, which has always played a role in the anti-colonial struggle on a theoretical level, revealed itself powerless in face of the unforeseen implacable development of the war. Their political action remained timid and ineffective because of their old assimilationist conceptions, and their erroneous idea of the evolutionary nature of the colonial regime, and its ability to transform itself peacefully."

China, too, has revealed itself devoid of revolutionary principle in its dealings with Algeria. Considering diplomatic maneuvers with the Soviet Union and the neo-colonialist regimes of Africa to be more important than the fate of the Algerian revolution, China rushed to endorse the military council of Col. Boumedienne the day following the coup. In this way China hoped to gain favor with the new regime and thus be allowed to play a major role in the Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to begin June 29. The outraged students of Algiers showed their contempt by publicly burning the Chinese flag in the streets.

D. N. Aidit, head of the Indonesian Communist Party, the largest Communist Party in the non-socialist world and under Peking's influence, stated to the press three days after Ben Bella's ouster that the coup came as no surprise to him, for Ben Bella was following a right wing policy "contrary to the



Former President Ahmed Ben Bella

aspirations of the Algerian people." Aidit went even further to say, "the situation in Algiers is now better than it was under the regime of Ben Bella. We should thank Col. Boumedienne for his efforts to create a better atmosphere in the final days preceding the Afro-Asian Conference."

Mao Tse-tung notwithstanding, the military coup led by Boumedienne is a serious setback both for the Algerian revolution and the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle. In sharp contrast to China's attitude, the response of the revolutionary leadership of Cuba was to condemn the military seizure of power as having "no possible justification." (*The Militant*, July 26, 1965). Knowing full well that Cuba was risking a diplomatic break with Boumedienne, Castro stated "if they should break relations with us, they should not be the first military regime to do so. We are thinking of the future, and we do not act as opportunists, but as Marxist-Leninists."

Ben Bella unquestionably made serious mistakes during his three years of leadership. He relied on compromises and deals within the leading circles

rather than appealing to the workers and peasants; he substituted personal power for collective leadership; and most important, he failed to lead the left wing of the FLN in a fight to transform the party into an organization capable of protecting and extending the gains of the revolution. Despite Ben Bella's failures, he was the popular leader of the socialist tendency of Algeria, and gained his support by his defense of the workers' and peasants' self-management committees which controlled the nationalized sector of the economy.

Although the military leaders who removed Ben Bella from power are not the *direct* instruments of counterrevolution, their coup can serve only to encourage those hostile to the socialist development of Algeria. Boumedienne's isolation from the masses of peasants and workers will oblige him to depend even more on the support of the imperialist powers.

Unless the people of Algeria organize to prevent the consolidation of the Boumedienne regime, it will be a long time before the revolution takes another step forward.

blind yourself to the historic development of everything that's taking place on this earth today. You'll see other things.

"Why will you see them? Because . . . the system in this country cannot produce freedom for an Afro-American. It is impossible for this system, this economic system, this political system, this social system, this system, period. It's impossible for this system as it stands to produce freedom right now for the black man in this country."

On several occasions Malcolm X publicly predicted that unless black people were given Freedom Now, the ghettos of this country would become like the Casbah of Algeria, where a white man would not be able to enter for fear of his life. The uprising in Watts indicates that we may very well see that happen.

Now, at the height of America's prosperity, in the era of the "Great Society" we see the most oppressed section of American workers, those of the black ghetto, and the most sensitive section of the intellectuals and students, those in the anti-war movement, coming out in revolt against this degenerate society.

Though black people are much more in revolt than most white radicals the ends of both can only be achieved by coming together at some point in joint action. One prerequisite for joint action is that radical whites recognize the need for independent organization by Negroes and their right to self determination. Without that it is hard to conceive of any cooperation between whites who want to change society and the black people of Watts.

... L.A. Revolt

(continued from page 6)

Malcolm X was assassinated before the rise of the anti-war movement, when there was no sign of a mass movement of whites in opposition to the system. Yet he recognized the ultimate need for such an alliance and was willing to cooperate with the small group of white revolutionary socialists.

He spoke about white militants (downtown) and black militants (uptown) before an audience made up largely of white radicals and Negroes at the Militant Labor Forum on Jan. 7, 1965, less than two months before his death.

"You have all types of people who are fed up with what's going on. You have whites who are fed up, you have blacks who are fed up. The whites who are fed up can't come uptown [to Harlem] too easily because uptown is more fed up than anybody else and they are set up so that it's not so easy to come uptown

"So when the day comes when the whites who are *really* fed up, I don't mean those jive whites, who pose as liberals and who are not, but those who are fed up with what's going on, when they learn how to really establish the proper type of communication with those uptown who are fed up and they get some co-ordinated action going, you'll get some changes. And it will take both, it will take everything you've got, it will take that."

"You'll see terrorism that will terrify you and if you don't think you'll see it you're trying to

Young Socialist

Interviews

FRENCH COMMUNIST STUDENT

The following interview was obtained by Jack and Elizabeth Barnes, officers of the Young Socialist Alliance, while in France in July of this year. The student interviewed has participated in French radical student politics for a number of years. He was active in the student movement against the war in Algeria and is now in the left wing of the French Communist Student Youth.

Since the Algerian War the left wing in this organization has been growing. The conservative French Communist Party leaders have attacked it and in many cases have expelled its members. For this reason the student who gave this interview asked that we not give his name. Some of the statements made here might provide the pretext for his expulsion and this would make it impossible for him to continue to help build the left wing tendency.

Q. What is the attitude among youth in France toward the war in Vietnam?

A. I would say that the majority of the French people as a whole are against the war and this would include young people.

Q. How would you explain this?

A. In France there is a very strong anti-U. S. feeling. The people are to a large extent against the war because it is the U. S. which is involved. It is this anti-U.S. feeling which De Gaulle exploits.

Q. How would you explain this anti-U. S. feeling?

A. The French socialists and communists oppose the U.S. actions in such places as the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Cuba and the Congo for political reasons. For those people who are not so political the anti-U. S. feeling stems to a certain extent from French nationalism, but it is not only that. I think French people believe that Americans think that since their country is wealthy and militarily strong, they have the right to control things. They believe that the U.S. government is arrogant and wants to usurp the decision making rights of other countries.

Q. Could you go into more detail about the attitudes of the more radical French people, especially the students, on the role of the U. S. in Vietnam?

A. Yes, they consider the U.S. to be an occupying force in Vietnam which is oppressing people there. They see photos of the torture and the bombings on TV and in the newspapers and these increase their opposition. Even *Le Monde*, which is a liberal paper in France, is critical of the war because they believe that "it is not the best way to fight communism."

Q. Is there any organized movement here against the war?

A. Thus far there have been no organizations formed against the war, and the existing Socialist and Communist organizations have been active only in a minimal way, holding small demonstrations and circulating petitions. There was one demonstration in the Latin Quarter in May which drew a thousand people. There have also been large student demonstrations in Lyons and Cannes.

The left-wing student leaders, both inside and outside of the Communist Party, are now discussing the formation of a broad anti-imperialist organization which would concentrate on protesting the war in Vietnam and American intervention in Santo Domingo. I believe that there would be a lot of support for such an organization. In Lyons when formation of such an organization was announced there were 900 immediate responses to the call. Now the students are on vacation and in France it is very difficult to organize anything during the vacation period, but next fall I think we will be able to build an organization of young people to protest the war.

Q. Do most students support the position of De Gaulle or are they to the left of him?

A. This is a very interesting and complicated question. There is much confusion in the political thinking of the students. Most students are not for De Gaulle. They do not believe in his undemocratic form of rule or in his political orientation. But many vote for him because they do not like the positions of the other parties or because they believe that at least De Gaulle unifies the country and has some good positions on foreign affairs. It is confusing to students, for example, when De Gaulle comes out for French withdrawal from NATO and the Communist Party does not. There is no strong Gaullist Party or organization and no large segment of the population which backs De Gaulle's political ideas. The Gaullist newspaper has a very low readership.

The attitude of the Communist Party toward De Gaulle does much to confuse its members and its millions of sympathizers in France. It in effect gives support to De Gaulle by arguing that he is coming closer to their position. They say that radicals should orient toward pushing De Gaulle to the left. At the same time they say they are for a new republic and for democracy. They hold that De Gaulle is good in foreign policy and bad on national policy. This is especially confusing for the French workers who do not like De Gaulle's domestic policies. I believe that the unclear and equivocal position of the French Communist Party may lose them as many as a million votes to De Gaulle in the next election, but we shall have to see what happens.

Q. What issues and questions besides that of Vietnam have radical students been concerned with in the past couple of years?

A. With the colonial revolution, especially with the revolutions in Algeria and Cuba. Every summer around a hundred students from France visit Cuba, even though it is a very expensive trip for us.

An issue that is of general interest here, which is not the case in the United States as far as I know, is that of Stalinism. Because of the large size of the Communist Party here and because it has the allegiance of the majority of French workers those students in France who are radical naturally have to deal with the question of Stalinism. The Khrushchev revelations at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Revolution, along with the Algerian and Cuban revolutions, were very important in raising questions among French

communists about the correctness of the positions of the French Communist Party and those of the Soviet Union. The dispute between China and the Soviet Union has served to stimulate even more questioning and debate.

The failure of the French Communist Party to analyze clearly Gaullism and to put forth a viable left wing alternative has led many young people to reject it and to look for a way to create an alternative. There is a very important discussion going on among young French communists and radicals about how and if a new revolutionary party should be organized in France. Students are asking: "What after De Gaulle?" "What is the political perspective for France," and "Can there be a socialist revolution in Europe?"

These students are considering all ideas now. First they want to know what the different radical ideas and arguments are in order to decide their own perspectives. They do not want anyone to tell them what they should think or believe. The works of Trotsky and Deutscher have become popular in this debate and the old slanders and vilifications of Trotsky put forth by the French Communist Party have not stood in the way of this.



French Communist Party headquarters

There is a radical bookstore, La Joie de Lire in Paris where many of the young radicals go to buy books and pamphlets. This bookstore is run by Maspero, a Frenchman who had his store bombed during the Algerian war because he was pro-Algerian. Maspero's store makes available radical literature from every group and radical persuasion: pro-Chinese, pro-Khrushchevite, Trotskyist, etc.

Q. What are the main student and youth groups in France and how many young people do they involve?



French Foreign Legionnaires fight Algerians in the streets of Algiers

A. I would estimate that in the Communist Party Student Youth there are approximately 4,000 members. There are working class youth groups organized by the Communist Party, but these are mainly social, not political, organizations. The Unified Socialist Party (left Social Democratic) has about 500 student youth. There is a large student union in France with a left-wing leadership which has about 80,000 members. I would say that there are about 40,000 radical students who do not belong to any particular organization.

Q. Are there any important infringements on civil liberties in France?

A. Although parliamentary democracy has broken down in France, I believe that there are more civil liberties in France than in the United States. The Communist Party is legal here and there is freedom of speech. Marxists and other radicals can teach in the universities and schools. At this time, though, there is a ban on demonstrations. When we plan a demonstration we cannot announce publicly the place or time, and when we do hold them the police usually try to break them up.

Q. Our American readers who are involved in the anti-war movement would be very interested in the French movement against the war in Algeria.

First, how much support was there in France for the Algerian cause during the war?

A. The majority of the French population at the beginning of the war were in favor of the French side. There is no question that this attitude was partly the result of French anti-Arab racial prejudice. As the war in Algeria wore on though, the attitudes of many Frenchmen began to change. In 1956 a very significant thing happened. A movement developed among some of the French soldiers to call for an end to the war. This movement lasted for about four or five months. The soldiers even succeeded in stopping a troop train going to Algeria. The Communist Party did not support this movement and the soldiers involved were of course very bitter about this. In 1956 a movement among students in opposition to the war also began. Among the political students there was a great deal of sympathy for the Algerian cause.

By the end of the war I would say that the majority of the French people were against the war. During the war two million French soldiers had served in Algeria and when the war ended 500,000 French soldiers were in Algeria. The people opposed the war because they were tired of the deaths and injuries and of having relatives taken away from home, not because they were sympathetic to the Algerian cause. To a certain degree there was a feeling of guilt among some people as they started to realize the horror of the war. They were affected by such things as the reports in such papers as *Le Monde* of the tortures carried out by Frenchmen against the rebels.

Q. What were the stands of the Communist and Socialist Parties on the war?

A. The Algerian war precipitated a crisis in the Communist Party, especially among its student members. This party took the position that Algeria should have "self-determination within the French Union" but it did not come out directly for Algerian independence. In their first statement on the Algerian struggle they went so far as to criticize the National Liberation Front (FLN) for being provocative and urged them not to use violence in their struggle. The record of the French Communist Party was so bad that the FLN wrote an open letter to the French workers criticizing the Party's stand on the war and urging them to support the FLN and the Algerian cause.

The Social Democratic movement had a strong left wing which supported the Algerians although the majority were not for Algerian independence. This may not seem important in the U.S., but

in France where the Social Democratic and Communist Parties were looked to as the obvious organizers of any protest the weak position which these parties took had a very discouraging effect on those who opposed the war and were ready to organize protests against it. A split of 20,000 from the Social Democratic Party, a group which later took the name of the Unified Socialist Party, did give aid to the Algerian cause and came out for Algerian independence in its paper.

**THE ORIGINS OF
MATERIALISM**
BY GEORGE NOVACK



"In this book George Novack not only explores a subject that has received too little attention, but employs a new and unusual method of doing so. He relates the first materialists to their socio-economic surroundings and thus offers new insights on the origins of materialism."

Professor Joseph Fontenrose
Department of Classics
University of California, Berkeley

Publication Date Oct. 1 cloth 326 pp \$6.95
PRE-PUBLICATION PRICE TO YS READERS: \$5.00

MERIT PUBLISHERS, 5 E. Third St., New York, N.Y. 10003

Q. Were there any organizations formed to help the Algerian cause?

A. The students in France were the most active in giving aid to the Algerian cause. When the war broke out they built an organization called the Front of Socialist Liberation.

Two years after the Front of Socialist Liberation was formed a Catholic progressive movement called the Youth Resistance grew up in support of the Algerian cause. One of the leaders of this movement was Francis Jeanson, a close associate of Jean Paul Sartre. A year later in 1957, the Front of Socialist Liberation and the Youth Resistance fused into one organization which kept the name of Youth Resistance.

Q. Did you belong to either of these organizations?

A. I joined the Youth Resistance along with other Communist students.

Q. How big was the Youth Resistance?

A. There were about 700 of us.

Q. What kinds of activities did you engage in?

A. We carried out a propaganda campaign in support of the Algerian cause and we gave them physical aid as well.

Q. Was there any experience which you had which you think our American readers might be especially interested in?

A. Our most well known action was when we stopped a troop train en route to Algiers one year before the peace. In this way we got quite a bit of publicity for the cause. Many of the activists in support of the Algerian cause have been forced to remain in Algeria since independence because the French government would prosecute them for their activity if they returned to France.

Q. You mentioned earlier that you were a member of the French Communist Party. After you became involved in helping the Algerian revolution did you not find your activities in contradiction with the attitude of the Communist Party?

A. Yes, to a certain extent this is true. And I found that there were others in that organization who had developed disagreements with the Communist Party. Some of these young people became part of a left wing in the Party, which has grown among Communist students since then.

Q. Were there any actions taken specifically against the OAS terrorist activities toward the end of the war?

A. Many students wanted to take action against the OAS toward the end of the war. Anti-fascist organizations were formed, especially among students. After three or four months of activity these anti-fascist organizations formed a united organization called the University Front Against Fascism. We held many demonstrations. The largest was in the Latin Quarter and drew 4,000 to 5,000 students. There were about 8,000 students in the Front. Of course, when the OAS activity ceased at the end of the war the anti-fascist groups became inactive too. Once again the FCP was critical of the UFF because they saw it as a potential organizing center for a left wing. Just as in the Youth Resistance the CP leadership either openly or covertly attacked the work of these groups and were especially upset because of the leading role the French Trotskyists played, especially in the defense of Algeria.

...Notes

(continued from page 2)

to End the War in Vietnam consisting of representatives from anti-war committees in 22 different cities, with an office in Madison, Wisconsin. Plans were also made for internationally coordinated protest activities against the war on October 15 and 16, and for a national convention of all anti-war organizations over the Thanksgiving holidays.

SDS NATIONAL CONVENTION: Representatives from thirty areas met in Kewadin, Michigan early this summer for the National Convention of the Students for a Democratic Society. One of the main decisions by the convention was the passing of two anti red-baiting amendments to the constitution, thus establishing SDS as an open non-exclusive organization willing to work with all those who have agreement on certain basic issues.

Specific proposals to implement SDS's national focus against the war in Vietnam were discussed, including: the Continental Congress, another Washington march, an international teach-in, a national protest day, and the leafleting of army bases.



Socialist sculptor Duncan Ferguson lectures to Chicago summer school at Art Institute.

YOUNG SOCIALIST SUMMER SCHOOLS: Over two hundred young people regularly attended summer schools sponsored by the Young Socialist Alliance in eleven cities this summer.

Highlighting the summer schools for those in the Midwest was the Detroit Socialist Educational Weekend over the Fourth of July. One hundred young people from Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland and Toronto participated in the three days of lectures, discussions, and seminars.

PROTESTS AGAINST THE WAR: Two members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party drafted a statement opposing the war which has been circulated throughout Mississippi. Although it is not an official statement by the FDP, it reflects the growing feeling among the Negro people against

the war. It says, in part: "No Mississippi Negroes should be fighting in Vietnam for the white man's freedom until all Negro people are free in Mississippi.

"No one has a right to ask us to risk our lives and kill other colored people in Santo Domingo and Vietnam so that the white American can get richer. We will be looked upon as traitors by all the colored people of the world if the Negro people continue to fight and die without a cause."

". . . We can write and ask our sons if they know what they are fighting for. If he answers freedom tell him that's what we are fighting for here in Mississippi.

"And if he says democracy, tell him the truth—we don't know anything about communism, socialism, and all that, but we do know that Negroes have caught hell right here under this American democracy."

DRAFTEE PROTESTS WAR: Pieter Clark, writing in the *National Guardian* (July 31, 1965) about his experiences at his induction center in Chicago notes that many of his fellow inductees were not enthusiastic about being drafted to fight in Vietnam. He had passed out 200 leaflets against the war and collected 22 signatures on an anti-war petition before he was stopped by army personnel. To keep him from influencing the other inductees, he was placed in isolation with a guard while he waited to take his physical.

STUDENT TO SPEAK ON VIETNAM TRIP: Carl Oglesby, president of SDS, will be touring college campuses this fall, speaking against the Vietnam war. During his visit to South Vietnam this summer, he was able to talk with members of the National Liberation Front, and will be able to give a first hand account of what is taking place.

JUSTICE IS EXPENSIVE. To discourage the 760 Berkeley students, who were indicted as a result of their activity in the Free Speech Movement, from appealing the judge's decision, the total bail was set at the exorbitantly high figure of \$440,000. Many of the students have spent times in jail, because of the difficulty of raising the bondman's premium. If the appeal fails, the students face fines totaling \$200,000.

Mrs. Susan Stein, writing for the FSM Defense Fund, stated: "This country does not yet have laws forbidding political protest. But it is more pernicious to make political protest impossible by taxing it so heavily through fines and excessive bail, that those who would protest dare not. The right of political protest must not become a luxury which few can afford."

To send a contribution or for further information, write: FSM Defense Fund, Box 448, Berkeley, California.

ANTI-WAR COMMITTEES EXPAND PROTESTS: Committees to End the War in Vietnam, which grew out of the committees supporting the March on Washington and the teach-ins, are continuing their activity throughout the country. Demonstrations, discussions, teach-ins, news letters, literature tables, and rallies are some of the ways the committees register their opposition to the war and attempt to tell the truth about Vietnam.

Throughout the summer, the committees organized demonstrations protesting Johnson's policy in Vietnam. 2,000 people demonstrated against Johnson when he visited San Francisco, and 700 turned out to picket Vice President Humphrey in Los Angeles. The Governors Conference held in the Twin Cities this summer was picketed by over 100 people. Many of the committees in the Midwest and on the West Coast held supporting actions in their own areas while the Assembly of Unrepresented People was taking place in Washington, D. C.

The teach-ins which began last March, are developing an international theme. Speakers from throughout the world will take part in an International Teach-in in Toronto on October 8.

FREEDOM ON THE CAMPUS: Professor Eugene Genovese, Professor of History at Rutgers University in New Jersey, has recently been under attack for his condemnation of the U.S. policy in Vietnam. Professor Genovese considers himself a Marxist socialist, and has presented his position of support for the National Liberation Front in the teach-ins in which he has participated. The right of a Marxist socialist teaching at a state university to hold his own opinions and advocate them publicly was upheld by a special session of the Board of Governors of Rutgers University.

STUDENT PROTEST THROUGHOUT THE WORLD:

GREECE: Ten to twenty thousand young people in Greece demonstrated almost daily to protest the ouster of Prime Minister Papandreou. Clubs and tear gas were used by police to disperse the demonstrators. Papandreou has been trying to defend liberal policies against the McCarthyite right wing backed by the monarchy.

PORTUGAL: Thirty-one students in Lisbon, Portugal are being tried as "communists" for opposing the government's restrictions on the press, lack of public liberties, and the government's



Minneapolis Committee to End the War in Vietnam pickets Governors' Conference in July

colonial policy in Angola and Mozambique. The trials are part of the Salazar regime's attempt to smash opposition to its policies among university students.

ECUADOR: Mass arrests and tear gas bombs were used to disperse student demonstrators this summer in Ecuador. At Guayaquil University, the dean of the faculty of political economy, the president of the student union, and fifteen students were arrested following a student strike. The students are protesting the military dictatorship and calling for elections.

DEFENSE FUND CONTINUES TO GROW: To raise money for the expense involved in appealing the case of the three Indiana University students who were indicted for their ideas and activities as socialists on the campus, the Berkeley Committee to Aid the Bloomington Students sponsored four performances by the Mime Troup, well known Bay Area pantomime group. Over one thousand people watched the lampooning and parodying of derogatory Negro stereotypes which is the theme of the Mime Troupe's Minstrel Show. The two weekends of performances enabled the Berkeley Committee to raise several thousand dollars for the defense of the three students.

Support continues to grow for the three defendants who were indicted under the Indiana Anti-Communism Act. Over 1,000 professors on 95 college campuses, and other prominent persons throughout the U.S., Canada, and England have become sponsors of the Committee. To find out what you can do in your locality, Write: (Committee to Aid the Bloomington Students, Box 213, Cooper Station, New York, New York.)

Build the movement against the war in Vietnam

ATTEND THE NATIONAL

ANTI-WAR CONVENTION

*OVER THANKSGIVING HOLIDAYS IN
MADISON, WISCONSIN*

called by the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam. This committee was formed by participants in the anti-war movement from 22 cities across the country who met at the August 6-9 Assembly of Unrepresented People in Washington, D.C.

For more information, write:

NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
1728 VAN HISE AVE.
MADISON, WISCONSIN

A weekly socialist newspaper

THE MILITANT

COVERAGE OF:
COLONIAL REVOLUTION
ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT
FREEDOM NOW STRUGGLE

4 months: \$1.00

1 year: \$3.00

116 University Pl., New York, N. Y.

YOUNG SOCIALIST SUBSCRIPTION

bi-monthly \$1.00 per year

Name

Address

YOUNG SOCIALIST
Box 471, Cooper Station
New York, N. Y. 10003

Build the movement against the war in Vietnam

ATTEND THE NATIONAL

ANTI-WAR CONVENTION

*OVER THANKSGIVING HOLIDAYS IN
MADISON, WISCONSIN*

called by the National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam. This committee was formed by participants in the anti-war movement from 22 cities across the country who met at the August 6-9 Assembly of Unrepresented People in Washington, D.C.

For more information, write:

NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE
TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM
1728 VAN HISE AVE.
MADISON, WISCONSIN

A weekly socialist newspaper

THE MILITANT

COVERAGE OF:
COLONIAL REVOLUTION
ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT
FREEDOM NOW STRUGGLE

4 months: \$1.00
1 year: \$3.00

116 University Pl., New York, N. Y.

YOUNG SOCIALIST SUBSCRIPTION

bi-monthly \$1.00 per year

Name

Address

YOUNG SOCIALIST
Box 471, Cooper Station
New York, N. Y. 10003